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ABSTRACT
For many years, foreign funded companies in China enjoyed a 
relatively low tax rate and a series of preferential policies which 
were aimed at encouraging foreign direct investment in China. By 
adopting a new law in 2007, however, the National People's 
Congress proclaimed the end of the dual corporate-income-tax 
system. From 2008, the preferential tax treatment of foreign capital 
will be phased out. As a result, the income tax rate for domestic 
and foreign funded companies will be unified at the rate of 25%.
This paper explores the impact of the dual corporate income tax 
system on both domestic and foreign funded enterprises and 
discusses the possible effects of the unification.
1. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2007, the fifth Session of the Tenth 
National People's Congress adopted the “Enterprise 
Income Tax Law of People's Republic of China (draft)". 
As a result, the income tax rate for domestic and foreign 
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funded companies will be unified at the rate of 25%. 
This law proclaims the end of the dual corporate-
income-tax system, which has been in effect for 30 
years. 
Foreign funded companies are defined as companies 
that are funded by foreign investors and with the 
permission of the Chinese government. The capital of 
these companies is provided by foreign companies or 
individuals either wholly or partially. In the former case, 
they are called wholly foreign funded companies; and in 
the latter case, they are called joint ventures. The capital 
of joint ventures is partly provided by foreign and partly 
by domestic investors, who will share the risks and 
profits according to their capital shares.
For many years, China has adopted specific 
legislation and regulations with regard to taxation of 
foreign funded companies. Foreign funded companies 
enjoyed a relatively low tax rate and a series of 
preferential policies which were aimed at encouraging 
foreign direct investment in China. As a result, the 
actual tax burden for foreign funded companies was 
considerably lower than that of the domestic funded 
enterprises. However, the preferential tax treatment of 
foreign capital will now be phased out over five years 
from 2008 and the corporate income tax rate for foreign 
funded companies will be eventually raised to the same 
rate as for domestic funded firms, which is 25%.
This paper explores the impact of the dual corporate 
income tax system on both domestic and foreign funded 
enterprises and discusses the possible effects of the 
unification.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Taxation is an oft-debated issue in China. Thus, 
there are a large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies concerning taxation in China, including 
concerning the dual nature of the corporate income tax. 
Hu and Wang (1992) developed models of the 
overall tax burden (defined as the tax/GDP ratio), which 
they use to simulate tax policies in 1995. They use data 
for 1979-1989 to test their models by applying the two-
stage least squares method and regression models. They 
conclude that the rapid growth of extrabudgetary 
revenues had been a vital factor that led to a lower 
overall tax burden in China than would have been the 
case in the absence of extrabudgetary revenues.
Wang (1995) analyses the dual tax regime for 
corporate income tax by examining not only differences 
between two corporate income tax rates, but also 
differences in respect of other relevant policies, 
including regular tax relief and the definition of the tax 
base. He confirms that tax burden of domestic funded 
companies is higher than that of the foreign funded 
companies. He also makes a number of suggestions 
regarding the unification of the dual tax system: 
1. The goal of taxation policy should be to unify all 
preferential tax systems, although within some 
reasonable limits special treatment of some foreign 
funded companies should remain possible.
2. The aim of giving preferential treatment should be 
mainly for implementing industrial policies in 
coordination with foreign investment and regional 
policies. 
3. The total amount of tax preferences should be 
reasonable and efficient. 
4. Preferential tax treatment should always be based on 
legislation, instead of informal and ad hoc decisions 
or regulations.
Yang, Ding and Hao (2000) undertook an empirical 
analysis of the tax burden of 100 industrial companies 
using data for 1996-1999. They also confirmed that tax 
burdens for foreign and domestic funded companies are 
unequal, and that the gap between the two categories of 
companies has been rising gradually year by year. 
Using data for 1987-1996 (i.e., for the period mostly 
before the 1994 fiscal reform), Wei (2000) developed a 
quantitative model of China's overall tax burden. He 
argued that while China's overall tax burden at around 
15.7% of GDP would be a reasonable level of tax 
burden, the actual tax burden was some 5 percentage 
points below that level and was falling. According to the 
author, this situation was not beneficial to the national 
economy and for the performance of the overall system 
of economic regulation. 
Hao (2001) argues that the higher tax burden for 
domestic funded companies relative to foreign funded 
enterprises is an incentive for capital investment to 
transfer from the domestic funded to the foreign funded 
businesses. Furthermore, the dual system of taxation
affects the capital market by generating two kinds of 
excess burden. One kind of excess burden is similar to 
the excess burden of a commodity tax causing a loss of 
consumer surplus. The second excess burden arises 
from the distortion of the allocation of capital noted 
above.
The Sichuan Provincial Finance Bureau (2002) 
carried out an investigation and a statistic analysis using 
data for 2,158 companies. They found that the actual 
income tax burden of foreign funded companies was 
lower by one-half than that of the domestic funded 
enterprises.
Cheng (2003) found that the difference in tax 
burdens of foreign and domestic funded companies is 
due to a combination of the different requirements for 
tax deductibles and the different tax rates (preferential 
rates for foreign funded enterprises). His empirical 
analysis also shows that the tax burden of domestic 
funded businesses is double heavier than that of foreign 
funded companies. 
Whalley and Wang (2007) identify a different 
problem with a unified enterprise tax structure in which 
tax treatment of state-owned enterprises, other private 
enterprises and foreign funded enterprises is similar. 
They argue that a higher tax rate on state-owned 
enterprises is called for on efficiency grounds as taxes 
on state-owned enterprises reduce shirking by the 
workers (resulting in lower productivity) and a reduced 
state-owned enterprise tax rate under a unified tax 
would relax the discipline on state-owned enterprises 
resulting in losses. Their results indicate a 0.26% of 
GDP welfare loss using 2004 data from a unified tax, 
and a larger loss relative to an optimal tax scheme. 
Alternatively, if they use a managerial control model 
instead of a worker control model, they find a 0.19% 
welfare loss from a unified tax, and larger losses relative 
to initial higher state-owned enterprise tax rates.
Although some of this literature is partly normative 
in nature, the empirical studies reviewed here clearly 
show that under the current dual corporate income tax 
regime in China, foreign funded companies are taxed at 
lower tax rates than domestic funded enterprises, and 
that non tax concessions offered to the foreign funded 
enterprises significantly add to the gap between the two 
groups of companies. Generally, however, little 
attention has been paid in the literature to the economic 
consequences of different tax regimes for foreign and 
domestic funded enterprise, in particular the 
consequences for the enterprises’ behavior and their 
efficiency. This article aims to fill this gap in the 
literature, at least partially.
3. DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE INCOME 
TAX BURDENS 
3.1. CORPORATE INCOME TAX BURDEN
The corporate income tax refers to the income tax 
liability of a certain company in a certain period of time, 
while the income tax rate is expressed as a percentage of 
taxable income. We can discern the absolute corporate 
income tax burden (the absolute amount) and the 
relative corporate income tax burden (relative to taxable 
income). The relative tax burden can be subdivided into 
the statutory tax burden and the effective tax burden. 
The statutory tax burden refers to the tax rate set by the 
government, that is, the amount of income tax as a 
proportion of taxable income. The effective tax burden 
refers to the enterprises’ final tax settlement verified by 
the tax authorities as a proportion of the company’s 
taxable income. 
3.2. TAX BURDEN OF DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN FUNDED COMPANIES
3.2.1 The growth rate of tax revenues exceeds that of 
GDP, raising the overall tax burden
Since 1997, the overall tax burden increases on 
average by one percentage point per year. In 1999, tax 
revenues amounted to 1.068 trillion yuan, in 2003 it had 
reached 2.047 trillion yuan and in 2005 it is up to 3.087 
trillion yuan. In 2006, it reached 3.764 trillion yuan, an 
increase of 677 billion yuan in one year. In 2006, the 
growth rate of tax revenues was over 15% and the 
overall tax burden increased to 18%, which was 1.3% 
higher than in 2005. Total income tax paid by 
companies and individuals amounted to 953.3 billion 
yuan and showed an increase of 25.4% relative to 2005. 
Total income tax revenue now accounts for 25.3% of 
total tax revenues. 
Graph 1. China's tax growth rate and tax burden, 1995-2005.
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Statistical Yearbook (listed years)
The graph above clearly shows that the growth rate 
of tax revenues consistently exceeded GDP growth rate 
over the last decade, raising the overall tax burden.
3.2.2 Foreign funded companies’ share in tax 
revenues does not keep pace with their growing 
share in industrial output
Since China’s economic reform and opening up, 
both domestic and foreign funded companies have made 
remarkable progress during the past 25 years and have
played an important role in the development of the 
Chinese economy. However, the tax burden of domestic 
funded enterprises is much higher than that of foreign 
funded firms. Especially, the share of foreign businesses 
in total tax revenues did not match their rising share in 
industrial output.
Data source: China Tax Statistical Yearbooks from 1998 to 2006.
Source: China Tax Statistical Yearbooks 1998-2006.
Graph 3. The indus trial output value of foreign-
funded  and domestic funded enterprises , 1995-
2005.
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Graph 2. Tax contribution of foreign funded and 
funded enterprises , 1995-2005.
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Graph 4. Tax contibution rate and industrial output 
value of foreign funded enterprises, 1995-2005.
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Sources: China International Trading Statistical Yearbooks (2003), 
China Business Yearbook (2006), and China Tax Statistical 
Yearbooks 1998-2006.
These graphs demonstrate that the share of domestic 
funded companies in gross industrial output has fallen in 
the period 1995-2003, whereas the share of foreign 
funded enterprises has been increasing. In the same 
period, the share of domestic funded firms in total tax 
revenues also decreased while that of foreign funded 
businesses increased. Since China’s reform and opening 
up, many foreign funded enterprises came to China to 
start their business and invest in China, which increased 
China’s total tax revenue. Graph-4 shows that although 
foreign funded enterprises have experienced a rapid 
growth in their share of total tax revenues from 1995 to 
2003, their industrial output value is still much higher 
than their tax contribution rate. From 2003 to 2005, the 
shares of domestic and foreign funded companies in 
total tax revenues and industrial output stabilized. 
However, a nearly 10% gap remained, which was even 
higher than the 7% gap of 1995.This clearly shows that 
foreign funded companies’ tax contribution rate does 
not match their industrial output share. 
3.3. DIFFERENT TAX BURDENS FOR 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FUNDED 
COMPANIES
3.3.1 Differences summarized
In the early 1980s, when China just began its 
economic reforms and opening up its markets, the lack 
of capital and technology were bottlenecks hampering 
the economic development. Hence, the government 
introduced policies that aimed at encouraging foreign 
investments, not only to attract foreign capital, but also 
to introduce new technologies. For example, special 
economic zones were created along the southeast coast 
to attract foreign capital that would benefit from tax 
holidays and other preferential tax policies. These 
policies have contributed considerably to the surge of 
foreign investments in China that persisted for three 
decades and that belong to the most important driving 
forces behind China’s dramatic economic growth. 
Although statutory tax rates for foreign and 
domestic funded enterprises are equal (normal tax rate: 
33%), foreign funded enterprises actually benefit from 
different tax treatments in many ways. That makes the 
effective tax rate much lower than 33%. Table 1 
summarizes the main differences.
Table 1. Differences in tax treatment of foreign and 
domestic funded enterprises
Programs Foreign funded 
enterprises
Domestic 
funded 
enterprises
Starting dates 
for tax 
liabilities
From the date the 
first profit is made
From the date 
of registration
Wage 
deduction
Can deduct their 
total actual wages
Cannot deduct 
all wages
Tax rate Can enjoy 
preferential 
income tax rate of 
15% from
central 
government  and 
no local tax
Taxable 
incomes:
< 30,000 yuan: 
18%; 30,000-
100,000 yuan: 
27%
Specific fees 
and taxes
None Taxes and fees 
– including 
urban 
construction 
and 
maintenance 
taxes, the 
surcharge for 
education, and
the urban land-
use tax - are 
only imposed 
on domestic 
funded 
enterprises
Table 1 (cont’d)
Preferential 
tax treatment
If a production 
oriented foreign 
funded enterprise 
invests in 
infrastructure over 
10 years, its tax 
assessment can be 
halved for 5 more
years;
reinvestments 
yield tax rebates;
others
None
Specific tax 
deductions
Can deduct more 
expenses 
including interest 
payments, trade 
unions fees, 
welfare and 
education fees, 
charitable 
contributions
None
Sources: Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax 
Law of People's Republic of China (applicable from July 1, 1991 to 
January 1, 2008). Interim Regulations on the PRC enterprise 
income tax (applicable from July 1, 1994 to January 1, 2008).
At the beginning of the reform and opening up, the
Chinese government introduced a number of 
preferential policies for foreign funded companies to 
attract foreign investment. The inflow of foreign capital 
in 2005 was 63.81 billion US dollars (excluding 
external borrowing), which is 28.2 times the amount in 
1985 and 1.7 times the amount in 1995. 1  The large 
inflows of foreign capital promoted the economic 
development in China. However, this whole process 
was coupled to the differences in tax treatments of 
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foreign and domestic funded companies as summarized 
in Table 1. 
The differences in tax rates need some clarification. 
For domestic funded businesses the tax rate is 33% 
consisting of a central government tax of 30% and a 
local government tax of 3%. Foreign funded enterprises 
are subject to a central government tax of 15%, but pay 
no local tax. Therefore, the real tax rate for foreign 
funded firms is 15%. Moreover, the foreign funded 
enterprises are exempt from some other taxes and fees 
that are only imposed on domestic funded companies.
Special preferential treatment of foreign funded 
enterprises was introduced for those industries that the 
Chinese government wants particularly to encourage. 
One example is that if a production-oriented foreign 
funded firm invests in infrastructure with an operation 
period over 10 years, its tax assessment can be halved 
for five more years, whereas domestic funded 
businesses do not have this concession. Another 
example is that if foreign funded enterprises reinvest 
their profits in China they are eligible for tax rebates, 
whereas domestic funded companies are not eligible. 
Admittedly, the government also provides tax incentives 
for domestic funded small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). SMEs with taxable incomes less than 30,000 
yuan enjoy a reduced income tax rate of 18%, whereas 
SMEs with taxable incomes from 30,000 to 100,000 
yuan qualify for a reduced tax rate of 27%. However, 
these reduced rates are still higher than the rate of 15% 
for foreign funded companies.
As a result, the preferential coefficient2 for foreign 
funded companies is higher than that of domestic 
funded enterprises. According to a survey carried out by 
the tax regulation department of the Sichuan Provincial 
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Tax Department, the preferential coefficient was 5.6 for 
domestic funded firms (see, Table 3) and 10.28 for 
foreign funded businesses. 
The fact that foreign funded companies can deduct 
more expenses and to a larger extent than domestic 
funded firms has important consequences. The capital 
depreciation rate that the tax law allows for domestic 
funded enterprises is too low compared with their actual 
capital consumption. As a result, their capital 
consumption is partly taxed. Yang, Ding and Hao (2000) 
analyzed the capital depreciation rate by using data 
about 100 manufacturing companies including domestic 
and foreign funded firms and covering 21 different 
industries for the period 1996-1999. They found that for 
domestic funded enterprises the annual capital 
depreciation rate was 0.045, while for foreign funded 
companies it was 0.073. 
3.3.2 ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT EFFECTIVE 
TAX RATES 
Empirical data (see Table 2) show that the actual
corporate income tax rates for foreign funded 
companies were within the range of 10-15% in recent 
years (Zhang, 2006), which is less than half the nominal 
rate of 33%.
According to a survey held by the Sichuan Financial 
Bureau in 2000 among 2,158 domestic funded 
companies, the actual tax burden varied between 23.3% 
and 29.4%. The average burden amounted to 26%, 
which was considerably higher relative to foreign 
funded firms’ tax burdens.
Table 2. Actual tax rate of foreign funded companies
Year (1) (2) (3)
2002 61.60 510.87 12.06
2003 70.54 680.00 10.37
2004 93.25 693.32 13.45
2005 114.77 790.18 14.52
Notes:
(1) Income tax paid by foreign funded companies (billion yuan)
(2) Profits of foreign funded companies (billion yuan)
(3) Actual income tax rate of foreign funded companies (%)
Sources:
(1) Income tax paid by foreign funded companies is taken from 
www.chinatax.gov.cn/data.jsp.
(2) Profits of foreign funded companies are accounted according to 
the statistics in China quarterly tax revenue report (2002-2005). 
Table 3. Analysis of tax burden of domestic funded 
companies
Type Nominal 
tax rate
Actual 
tax rate
Preferential 
coefficient
State-owned 
companies
32.96 29.39 3.57
Collective-
owned 
companies
29.20 24.02 5.18
Limited 
corporation
31.35 23.31 8.04
Average 31.17 25.57 5.6
Source: Tax Regulation Division of Sichuan Provincial Finance 
Department, Analysis of the Corporate Tax Burden in 2000.
The overall tax burden of domestic funded 
companies includes not only the corporate income tax, 
but also various fees and levies imposed by local 
governments. According to statistics published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics, large and medium-sized 
state-owned companies subsidize workers’ housing, 
medical care, tuition, etc. to a total amount of 15-20% 
of total costs. More than 50% of the payroll is spent on 
pensions of retired staff and subsidies for extra staff.
4. EFFECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TAX 
TREATMENT 
4.1 NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Undoubtedly, preferential tax policies for foreign 
investment have contributed to increasing the inflow of 
foreign capital and, thereby contributing to the growth 
rate of the Chinese economy. However, these policies 
also have certain disadvantages. 
a. The phenomenon of "fake foreign capital" 
Domestic funded companies tend to transfer their 
capital to foreign countries and reinvest it in China in 
order to enjoy preferential tax treatment. This 
phenomenon of "fake foreign capital" reduces the 
economy’s efficiency. For example, total foreign direct 
investments in China amounted to 60.63 billion dollars 
in 2004, but almost 1/3 of them were provided by 
domestic companies registered abroad. This suggests 
that an amount of up to 20 billion dollars was “fake 
foreign capital”. Most of these investments came from 
off shore financial centers (like Hong Kong), where it is 
relatively easy to register companies, rather than from 
the developed countries.
b. Preferential tax treatment leads to unfair competition
Many large domestic funded companies have not only 
to pay different taxes, various fees, and apportions, but 
also to provide newspapers and to engage in 
sponsorships, payments of schools, hospitals, 
kindergartens, etc. These extrabudgetary fees amount to
15-20% of total costs, reducing companies’ profitability. 
According to the 2004 economic census, the fees paid 
by domestic funded SMEs are estimated at about 300 
billion yuan, whereas foreign-funded companies do not 
have to pay this kind of fees.
The additional burden resulting from extrabudgetary 
revenues increases the cost of domestic funded 
companies, which makes domestic capital less attractive 
than foreign capital. Therefore, it gives rise to unfair 
competition. What is more, the extra tax burden of 
domestic companies leads to tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, which aggravates the problem of unfair 
competition. 
4.2 THE NEW POLICY 
Although under the new legislations the corporate 
income tax rate for foreign funded companies will 
increase, the unification will most likely not reduce 
foreign direct investment dramatically for the following 
reasons.
a. A transition period 
The new “Enterprise Income Tax Law of People's 
Republic of China (draft)" provides for a transition 
period of five years. Thus, the effective tax rate of 
foreign companies will be increased gradually over this 
period. Moreover, the preferential policies will not be 
completely abolished, but rather adjusted to a 
reasonable mode, which aims at encouraging foreign 
capital flows to specific industries. For example, the 
15% corporate income tax rate will continue to apply to 
hi-tech companies to encourage innovation. Moreover, 
even a 25% corporate income tax rate is still relatively 
low compared to the 29% average rate in the developing 
countries.
b. Enterprises’ responses
Although the tax policy of the Chinese government 
affects foreign investment, it is not the only reason that 
makes the nation attractive to foreign capital. The 
Chinese government particularly stresses nontax factors 
that attract foreign capital including the huge and 
growing domestic market, a favorable investment 
climate, low labor costs, the presence of trained and 
diligent workers, etc. These factors would continue to 
make China a favorable choice for foreign capital.
Only after the new law will have been in effect for a 
number of years the actual effects on enterprise 
behavior can be established. At this point we can only 
formulate hypotheses that can be tested later on. 
First, it can be hypothesized that domestic 
enterprises, whether they are state-owned or privately 
owned, will not respond differently to the unification 
compared with private companies. If they seek profit 
maximization there is no reason to respond to the 
unification in the first place. If profits have been 
maximized before tax, they are also maximized after tax. 
Second, the phenomenon of “fake foreign capital” 
may be reduced in size as the incentive for its very 
existence will gradually diminish. This should increase 
the economy’s efficiency.
Third, the inflow of foreign capital may diminish 
even though the position of the Chinese government is 
that it will not. Alternatively, if non tax factors are as 
important as the Chinese government’s claims, the 
inflow of foreign capital may not diminish, but rather 
become more selective in respect of the sectors into 
which foreign capital is invested. That is, the inflow of 
foreign capital may be redirected to the most innovative 
sectors, which may positively affect the growth rate of 
the Chinese economy.
6. CONCLUSION 
Tax revenues have shown a substantial growth over 
recent years. The growth rate of tax revenues exceeded 
the growth rate of GDP for several years and, as a result, 
the overall tax burden rose to 20% in 2006. This paper 
has shown that although the share of total tax revenues 
that can be attributed to foreign funded companies also 
grew, it is relatively low compared with the rate of 
growth in their industrial output. The actual income tax 
burden for foreign funded companies is less than 15% 
(Table 2) and for domestic funded companies about 
26% (Table 3). 
There is a big gap between tax rates for foreign and 
domestic funded companies. The main reason for this 
difference is the preferential tax treatment of foreign 
funded firms in terms of the tax rate. Other factors 
include differences in tax deductions and extrabudgetary 
fees that come on top of the corporate income tax for 
domestic funded enterprises. 
The difference in tax burdens has brought about 
several disadvantages that need to be addressed. In this 
context, the unification of the income tax rate is an 
essential reform. The main (nontax) reasons for China’s 
attractiveness for foreign investments will continue to 
exist as before. As a result, it can be expected that the 
new policy will not adversely affect the robust trend of 
growing foreign investment in China. Furthermore, 
because the future inflows of foreign capital may be 
redirected to the most innovative sectors, the new policy 
may indeed positively affect the growth rate of the 
Chinese economy. Finally, the phenomenon of the “fake 
foreign capital” should gradually diminish, thereby 
increasing the efficiency of China’s economy.
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